



In the late 1960's, the Depression survived only in the speeches of
William McChesney Martin, and the proportion of debt in the capital
structure of many corporations was allowed to increase. Conglomerates
grew by transmuting the blue-chip common of acquired companies
into the conglomerate's own convertible debentures, thereby saving
taxes and in some cases, eliminating large numbers of minority stock-
holders. American firms operating abroad found debt more acceptable
to foreign investors than common stock. But with so many high debt
equity ratios, it may take far less than a depression to jeopardize the
solvency of many large corporations. Some firms are already experienc-
ing a hangover from the leverage binge of a few years ago, and must
now jettison subsidiaries to lighten the debt load. This spectre of
bankruptcy is a concern not only to the executives and investors whose
jobs and holdings are imperiled. Congressmen have recently warned
against the dangers of employing fancy-featured securities' and the
New York Stock Exchange has de-listed some debentures because of a
high default risk.2 Such fears could to some extent be alleviated if it
were possible to issue debt without increasing the possibility of bank-
ruptcy. This article suggests one method of doing so.
Corporate reorganization or bankruptcy involves more than a re-
shuffling of corporate assets among different classes of security holder
-the pie shrinks while being split. Bankruptcy proceedings and re-
organizations are notoriously costly. Aside from their direct cost in
legal fees, fights among different classes of creditors and stockholders
may consume management energy, preclude new investments, and
upset normal business relationships.3 Because investors are unsure of
f Member of the New York Bar. LL.B., Yale Law School, 1967.
if Ph.D. candidate in Economics, Yale University; LL.B. Yale Law School, 1967.
The authors wish to thank Profs. Boris Bittker, William Brainard, Victor Brudney and
Marvin Chirelstein, and Mr. Steven Fenster for their helpful comments, and Mr. Charles
Dunetz for research assistance.
1. Wall. Street Journal, March 25, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
2. The delisted issues were $16 million of General Host Corporation 7% subordinated
debentures, due in 1974, and $102 million of NVF Co. 5% subordinated debentures due
in 1994. The stock exchange found that interest payments on the bonds might exceed
available earnings, and that common equity in the corporation would amount to less than
25% of total capitalization.
3. See Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J. Fnuxc 895
(1967).
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the capital structure which will emerge from the reorganization, secu-
rity prices tend to fall even farther than the business shipwreck war-
rants.
Even if default and reorganization do not occur, the anticipation by
investors that such steps might be necessary entails an expense to the
corporation. A corporation's choice of capital structure is, at present,
largely dictated either by management's fear of insolvency or that of
its creditors. Lenders know that security for their loans cannot fully
protect them against bankruptcy costs, and they will usually include
in their mortgage indenture a limitation on further borrowing. How-
ever, since interest on debt is deductible and dividends on equity
are not, the ideal capital structure should stress debt.4 If ruin were no
longer in prospect, management could maximize stockholder profits by
hiking the debt-equity ratio as high as tax law would permit. Apart
from this tax advantage, high debt-equity ratios may represent the most
efficient means of allocating risk in the economy. Since corporations
can borrow at lower transaction costs than individuals, efficiency re-
quires that corporate stock rather than individual portfolios be highly
levered. Risk-seeking individuals could achieve the effect of personal
leverage by buying stock while more cautious investors could hold a
larger proportion of bonds.5
For the above reasons, we believe that it would be worthwhile to
alter the form of debt securities so as to reduce the risk and cost of
reorganization. Several methods are conceivable, some of which have
4. A recent statement by the chief executive of Bethlehem Steel indicates that colpo-
rate management perceives the advantages of leverage:
People overlook [the capital investment problems] when they say, "Well, take your
coats off. Go out there in the world market and fight these people. You're inventive
and ingenious and so forth, and you've always fended them off before." They over-
look the difference in the capital structures of the rest of the world's steel industry
and the American steel industry. In the United States, the capital structure is an
average of 25 per cent debt and 75 per cent equity. And anywhere else In the world,
you find the reverse-75 or 80 per cent debt and 20 per cent equity. And people don't
think that that creates a rather unequal area to compete in, but let me tell you. The
Japanese, in the steel industry, if they make 22 per cent net profit on revenue dollars,
they're having a fine year. At twice that, we're having a terrible year. We can't pay
our equity holders a dividend. The Japanese, at 2 per cent, can pay a 10 per cent
cash dividend to the few stockholders they have and the banks couldn't care less, as
long as the steel people cover the debt service. So that if I were over there In Japan,
boy, anything over that debt service would look like a good price-as far as setting
your price in your market is concerned.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1969, at 13, col. I.
5. See Modigliani and Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN. Ray. 261 (1958); Baumol and Malkiel, The Firm's
Optimal Debt-Equity Combination and the Cost of Capital, 81 Q. J. EcoN. 547 (1967).
The latter conclude: "In general, the tax advantages of bond financing and the near
zero transactions costs incurred in undoing leverage make it desirable for the firm to
employ as much debt as is consistent with considerations of financial prudence." Id. at 571,
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already been tried. The indenture agreement might grant the company
a grace period before the subordinate creditors could throw it into
bankruptcy. This stop-gap measure, however, is of real help only to
those debtors who are temporarily embarrassed. The mere availability
of a stay of execution is unlikely to soothe management's apprehension
about raising the debt ratio. In addition, a grace clause would often
increase the costs of insolvency by extending a corporation's already
prolonged last rites.
Majority clauses are a more traditional means of avoiding formal
reorganization. The typical clause allows a majority (simple or larger)
of any class bondholders to compromise the rights of the entire class
to principal, interest or both. No fiduciary duty is imposed on the
bondholders in voting for a compromise, although in cases of stark
conflict of interest some duty may be inherent. But majority clauses
were subject to abuse during the reorganizations of the 1930s, and are
now severely limited by the Trust Indenture Act of 1934.0 A three-
quarters vote is required for any compromise. Principal cannot be
affected and no more than two years' interest may be sacrificed.7 Thus
major overhaul of the corporate capital structure by majority vote is
no longer possible. However, even with flexible majority clauses, the
delays and transaction costs inherent in creditor-voted reorganizations
would be sufficient to discourage higher debt-equity ratios.
Another possibility is to adapt to debt securities the practice of
giving preferred shareholders of a company the right to elect several
members of the board of directors whenever the company is delin-
quent in paying dividends. But this procedure might make the bond
indistinguishable from preferred for tax purposes. In addition, there
are intractable conflict-of-interest problems involved in class representa-
tion on boards of directors.
Rather than give bondholders a partial right to govern the defaulting
corporation, we propose to turn them into common stockholders before
the default occurs. Companies would issue "conversion option" bonds,
which would give the corporation the option at any time to convert
the bonds into common stock at a specified penalty rate.8 This conver-
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
7. Id.
8. To our knowledge, the only public issue of a similar security was by Associated Gas
& Electric Utility Corporations, one of the fashionable public utilities holding companies
of the 1920's. In 1928, Associated issued 5V% investment certificates, convertible at the
option of the holder into a bouquet of common and three types of preferred stork of an
affiliate, Eastern Utilities Investing Corp. After 5 years, the certificates would be con-
vertible at the issuer's option into ,5.50 dividend series preferred stock of Associated Gas
649
The Yale Law Journal
sion ratio would be several times more favorable to the bondholders
than the ratio of bond to stock price prevailing at the time the bond
was issued. For example, if the "conversion option" were attached to
an ordinary convertible, which the investor could exchange for one
share of common, management could force conversion but would be
required to issue four shares of common in return. The ratio would
be set sufficiently high so that management, representing the common
shareholders, would make use of the option only when default was no
longer a remote prospect.
To begin, let us assume that the object of the conversion-option
feature is to approximate the rearrangement of corporate control that
would follow from a Chapter X reorganization. The objective may be
modified to include the allocation to stockholders and bondholders of
the savings realized from avoiding the reorganization proceedings which
would have resulted if the holders of conventional indebtedness had
been free to enforce their rights. There are obvious problems in trying
to set a conversion ratio which will in all circumstances leave the debt
holders as well off as under a conventional reorganization. In such a
bankruptcy proceeding, former holders of debt are supposed to receive
new securities equal in value to the face amount of their old bonds or
debentures. Their position in the post-reorganization capital structure,
relative to the former shareholders, depends therefore on the face
amount of the bonds, and the net worth of the corporation at the time
of reorganization. When the indenture is drawn, only the former is
known. Because the latter is highly unpredictable, it is difficult to
determine the possible outcome of a Chapter X proceeding. But the
conversion option has to fix the relative shares of stockholders and
bondholders in advance. If bondholders are given more by the option
than they would receive in a bankruptcy reorganization, management
will probably choose a Chapter X proceeding anyway in order to avoid
too great a damage to stockholder equity. If they are given less, we will
fail in our objective of giving bondholders at least what they would
reap from a Chapter X proceeding.
The surplus realized from avoiding reorganization costs can remedy
these faults to some degree. Even if the holders of conversion option
: Electric Co. at the rates of one share for each $100 par value. Thete provisions are
recounted in Associated Gas & Electric Utility Corporations, SumMlnmY RaroT or Tilt
F9DEPAL TRADE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES ON tCONOMIC, rINANCIAL
AND CORPORATE PHASES OF HOLDING AND OPERATING COMPANIES OF EUEGrIC AND GAS
JT~ms 806-307 (1935). In conversation, we have heard that conversion option securities
have been used occasionally in private placements.
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debt receive a smaller share of the company than they would have
obtained in a bankruptcy reorganization, the diminished share, sans
reorganization costs, may be worth more than a larger piece of the
company, had it endured a Chapter X reorganization. The savings
from avoiding bankruptcy are not limitless, however, and te holders
of conversion option debt will face some contingencies in which they
will be positively worse off as a result of the conversion option.
Alternatively, we may modify this objective. A "conversion option"
bond can represent a new allocation of the risk and return available
from the corporation, involving a somewhat greater sharing of down-
side risk than is customary in debt securities. Such relatively high risk
debt would not, of course, appeal to all investors who presently hold
fixed-obligation securities. Corporate debt is held in large amounts
by banks and other financial institutions, which must themselves meet
fixed obligations, and which require maximum assurance of receiving
a security's face amount at maturity. Furthermore, the ability of such
institutions to participate in higher risk debentures is limited by federal
and state regulation. Such institutions would not be customers for this
type of conversion option debenture,
In recent years, however, the emergence of convertible debentures
has brought a new kind of customer into the debt market-one who
has more in common with equity investors than with risk-averse
financial institutions. Such investors buy convertible debt instead of
stock for several reasons, including the lower margin requirements
applicable to convertibles and the availability of a downside hedge
along with an upside speculation. No doubt, they place some value
on the debt holder's traditional assurance that, in the event of in-
solvency, debt holders receive face value in reorganization securities
before equity investors receive anything. Such safeguards are certainly
not as important for investors in convertibles as they are for more
senior lenders.9 If management is allowed to exercise the conversion
option at a 3-1 or 4-1 penalty rate, a sufficient hedge against dowuside
iisk will probably exist to attract the ordinary investor in convertible
debt. To the extent that he is assuming a greater risk, compensation
may be offered in the form of a higher interest rate or a more attractive
upside conversion price. Our earlier discussion suggests that corporate
managements would have ample reason to offer this compensating
premium. The company would be avoiding potential reorganization
9. The frequent gap between reorganization values and warkct vaucs raised some
questions about the worth of this guarantee to any class of debt holder.
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expenses. Management's own jobs would be more secure from a perilous
passage through Chapter X. And the company's senior debt would be
more attractive, since junior debt holders could not trigger a bank-
ruptcy reorganization, which would at least cause the company's bonds
to sell temporarily at a discount, and which might leave senior debt
holders with inflated reorganization paper.
There are two potential legal obstacles to issuing conversion-option
bonds. First, interest payments might be deemed non-deductible because
the security resembles equity more than debt. Tax law provides no
consistent talisman for debt. Formalities count heavily, even though
the cases bristle with warnings that the question is not what the secu-
rities "are called, but what in fact they are." 10 There are few cases
denying deductibility to securities of publicly traded corporations which
are designated as bonds. Even debt of a closely held corporation will be
treated as such, largely on the basis of designation, if the corporation is
not highly levered and if the security provides fixed interest payments
and a fixed maturity date.11
Some cases hold that a fixed maturity date is the major touchstone
of debt.12 Conventional convertible bonds, however, have a fixed matu-
rity only in the event that the owner chooses not to convert; the
"conversion option" bond does not in any greater sense violate a for-
malistic "fixed maturity" test simply by vesting the choice in the com-
pany. Majority clauses and bankruptcy reorganizations already modify
the creditor's right to receive the principal at maturity. Although the
absolute priority doctrine is supposed to insure that creditors, in a
reorganization, will receive new securities equal in value to the face
amount of their holdings, the value of the reorganization securities is
notoriously overstated. Bankruptcy costs may even place the lender
who has this protection in a worse postition than a conversion-option
holder.'3 Moreover, the issuer of a conversion option bond can only
10. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. J.N. Bray Company, 126 F.2d 612, 613 (5th
Cir. 1942).
11. See Comm'r v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1935); Utility Trailer
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Calif. 1962); Baker Commnoditie5 Inc. v.
Comm'r, 48 T.C. 374 (1967); Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 12 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 350 (1953).
Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related
Problems, 16 TAx L. REv. 1, 13 (1960). Sometimes deductibility has been upheld even with
extreme debt-equity ratios. (The ratio was 400-1 in Leach Corp. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 503
(1958), and 700-1 in Baker Commodities v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. '374 (1967)), or extendable
maturity dates (H.E. Fletcher Co., 20 P.H. Tax Ct. Memo. 51317,)
12. Assoc. Investing v. United States, 52 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 1210 (D.C. Kan. 1956). See
John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); McSorley's v. United States, 323 F.2d
900 (10th Cir. 1963); Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Comm'r, 50 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1931).
13. See Brudney, Investment Value Doctrine and Corporate Readjustment, 72 HAaV. L.
Rav. 645, 672 (1959); Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the SEC under
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avoid his obligation to repay the principal amount by converting at
a penalty rate. This action may be likened to that of paying liquidated
damages. The applicability of the fixed maturity standard to conversion
option bonds issued by publicly held corporations may itself be ques-
tioned. Most of the cases which have insisted on this standard have
involved closely held corporations. Furthermore, many opinions and
proposed restatements recognize only the business intent or require-
ments of the parties as determinative of the issue. 4
Another frequently used index of non-deductibility is the sub-
ordination of the claimed debt to those of trade creditors.1  This
question also arises mainly in cases which consider close corporations.
As applied to a conversion option issued by a publicly held corporation,
the subordination issue is identical to that presented by the fixed
maturity test. Is the security not debt because the corporation can,
at the cost of exercising an onerous option, change its terms of obliga-
tion? Once more, the question should turn on the similarity between
the exercise of the option and the outcome of reorganization proceed-
ings. If the option ratio is sufficiently steep, the conversion-option bond,
viewed at the date of issuance, will offer as firm a non-subordinated
status as does a conventional debenture.
The conversion-option bond might be viewed as placing the investor
in substance in the same position as a preferred or common stock
Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. 317, 39-10 (1941); Blum. The Law and
Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Cur. L. REv. 565, 571-80 (1950).
14. See Welshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Comm'r, 175 Fd 718 (9th Cir. 1919);
Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Calif. 192); Baker
Commodities, Inc. v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 374 (1967); Hearings on Aduisory Group Recom-
mendations on Subchapters C, J, & K of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 859 (1959) (ABA Section on Taxa.
tion, Legislative Recommendations In Respect of the Provisions of Subdhapter C), SectionC(4):
(C) DEBT-For all purposes of Subtitle A, indebtedness of a corporation shall be
deemed to include (but shall not be limited to) any unconditional obligation of a
corporation to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in-
curred for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth:(1) When the obligation is not subordinated by its terms to the claims of trade
creditors generally; and
(2) When, by the terms of the obligations, ultimate payment, if any, for use of the
principal amount is not dependent upon the earnings of the corporation, and is
unconditionally due not later than the maturity date of the principal amount; and(3) When the principal amount of obligations held in the aggregate by stock-
holders does not exceed by more than ten to one the fair value of the stock held
in the aggregate by stockholders immediately after the obligations are issued; or(4) In the event that an obligation fails to meet one or more of the other require.
ments of this subsection, the taxpayer claiming it to be indebtedness establisLhed
by a preponderance of the evidence that such failure was due to the business re-
quirements of the corporation.
15. See United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966); cf. P.M. Finance
Corp. v. Comm'r, 302 F.2d 786 (3 Cir. 1962), and cases cited in Note, 56 ditn. L. RP..
1334 (1958).
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holder in regard to his exposure to risk. As argued earlier, however,
no debt is free from risk, and contemporary financing methods, e.g.,
large scale borrowing and low-yield convertibles, offer many examples of
equally broad exposure. Even if the company's fortunes plummeted
and management exercised the conversion option, the holders of this
debt security would, depending on the conversion rate, be three, four,
or more times as well off as those who invested in equally priced
common stock at the issue date. Moreover, under normal circumstances,
management would regard conversion option bondholders as parties
adverse to the common shareholders whose interest it is charged to
protect. Management would violate its fiduciary duty in exercising the
conversion option if the low fortunes of the common did not make it
advisable from the shareholders' standpoint.
Of course, the interests of preferred stockholders are also opposed
to those of common stockholders, yet preferred dividends are not de.
ductible. The security provisions for the preferred, however, are often
less onerous than the penalty conversion rate of our suggested bond.
In any case, the distinction between preferred stock and bonds has
generally been left to depend on designation. The courts have sus.
tamined favorable tax treatment of income bonds, which require payment
of interest only as earned by the corporation. Even non-cumulative
income bonds which offer less protection than cumulative preferreds
are upheld.16 A management which issued conversion option bonds
might well choose to maintain interest payments even where there were
no earnings, in order to prevent massive dilution of the common.
Thus conversion option bonds are likely to have greater security of
income than the "income bonds" accepted as legitimate by the courts.
By either a formal or substantive test, the deductibility of interest
on such bonds should be sustained.17
16. Compare John Kelley v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), with the Circuit Coutt ophilon
in Talbot Mills v. Comm'r, 146 F.2d 809 (Ist Cir. 1944).
17. The tax status of Conversion Option Bonds may be affected by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969. Under the Act the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to issue regula.
ions, determining whether a corporate security is debt or equity. These regulations may
take into account the certainty of the issuer's obligation to pay a fixed amount at a set
date, and the subordination and convertibility of the security.
A more confusing change is an amendment to Section 305 of the Internal Revenue
Code altering drastically the treatment and definition of stock dividends. The amendment
provides for taxation of a distribution of stock which gives some bondholders property
(including cash) and gives others a larger proportionate interest in the company's earnings.
To keep within its reach all functional equivalents, the amendment treats lights to
acquire stock as stock and holders of convertible security as shareholders, and authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations that would treat as distributions
a broad range of transactions that increase any shareholder's interest in earnings and
profits. Given these definitions, a company's exercise of its conversion option might be
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The danger of fraud could create other legal obstacles to the con-
version option bond. The Securities and Exchange Commission, which
has the power to prevent the issuance of "inherently fraudulent" secu-
rities, might fear simply that the designation of the security as a bond
would mislead purchasers. If the conversion option is hidden in the
indenture, investors might give away their bankruptcy rights without
getting anything in return. This risk can be minimized if the security
is given a distinct name-the title "conversion option" bond would
alert investors as do the terms "income bond" and "non-cumulative
preferred." The security would then be inherently misleading only if
the penalty conversion rate were purely nominal (e.g., 1-1.5), in which
case the purchasers of conversion option debt would assume most of
the risks of ordinary common stockholders.
Finally, new SEC doctrines on the fiduciary obligation of investment
advisors and brokers should help to insure that buyers know what they
are buying. The SEC might also fear collusion between management
and bondholders to exercise the conversion option even if it is against
the interest of the common shareholders. To avoid this danger, one
might require management to show that there are no earnings to cover
interest payments before it can order conversion. But this requirement
is easy to evade, since income and expense items can be shifted between
calendar years without great difficulty. Any stricter requirement would
defeat the purpose of the conversion option, by maintaining the fixed
indebtedness even in times of deep corporate trouble. Alternatively,
one could require the approval of a majority of common shareholders
before the conversion could be exercised. Only in those cases where
the majority of shareholders also owned bonds would the danger of
treated as the payment of a stock dividend. The forced conversion would give the holders
of Conversion Option Bonds a larger number of shares than they could obtain by cxcr-
cising their own conversion rights while the company's release from interest obligations
might be interpreted as making possible the continued payments of cash dividend on
the company's common stock. Whether the amount of the taxable distribution would be
caculated is unclear, although it might be related to the difference betveen the interest
payments on the Conversion Option Bonds and the dividends the former bondholders
would receive in their common stock.
Although forced conversion could be brought within the words of the statutes, they are
not the kind of distribution Congress appears to have been aiming to tax. The target of
the Section 305 amendments was arrangements that permit companies to rerard one
group of shareholders with capital gains and with cash pay-outs, particularly if the choice
is left with the shareholding recipients. A company that exercised its conversion option,
on the other hand, would not be handing out differential rewards: it would be benefiting
one class of investors (common stock holders) at the expense. of another (the conversion
option bondholders). A company would not force a conversion unless the release from
interest payments and from the option to pay the principal amount wvas vworth more than
the increased interest in the company's earnings and profits going to its conversion option
bondholders. To treat the victims of the forced conversion as recipients of a taxable stock
dividend would be a perversion of the purposes of the Section 305 amendments.
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fraud remain. Finally, derivative suits could be relied upon to police
gross abuses of management discretion.
In sum, neither tax law nor securities regulation should impede an
offering of conversion option bonds. The new security would offer
the corporation all the advantages of conventional debentures, with
fewer risks; it should be worth a try.
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